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Abstract 
Online privacy policies are important mechanisms for informing web site users about the level of information privacy 
protection afforded when visiting web sites. To date, societal mechanisms and technologies have been the focus of attempts to 
improve the quality and effectiveness of online privacy policies. Little attention, however, has been given to the development 
and use of organisational measures for this purpose. In this paper we present findings from an empirical study of online 
privacy policies, resulting in a set of organisational guidelines for effective online privacy policies, which extend the research 
base in this area and, more immediately, will assist companies concerned about the impact of privacy concerns on consumer 
web usage. 
Keywords  IS Security, IS Policy, Managing IS, Risk 
INTRODUCTION 
The right to privacy was identified as a critical ethical issue of the information age some time ago (Mason, 1986), 
foreshadowing the emergence of information privacy as a major e-business concern (Agre and Rotenberg, 1997; Bingi et al, 
2000; Furnell and Karweni, 1999; Lichtenstein, 1997, 2001; Lichtenstein and Swatman, 2001). Information privacy addresses 
the legitimate collection, use and disclosure of personal information, as well as the interest an individual has in controlling, or 
at least significantly influencing the handling of data about themselves (Clarke, 1999a). User concerns about online 
information privacy are many and varied (Attaran and VanLan, 1999; Clarke, 1999b; Cranor et al, 2000; Wang et al., 1998), 
centring on "intrusions, manipulation, and discrimination; on special concerns about third parties capturing the sensitive self-
revelations users are making on the internet; and on concerns about identity theft and stalking through capture of personal 
information" (Westin, 2001). Not surprisingly, users take steps to reduce these perceived risks, including entering false 
personal information when submitting data to web sites (Fox et al, 2000; Gellman, 2002). The user concern about online 
privacy is driven by high levels of distrust of institutions, and fears of technology abuseand has been recognized as a 
critical factor in online consumer trust, and therefore, e-business success (Egger, 1999; 2001; Harris Interactive, 2002; 
Hoffman et al, 1999; Westin, 2001).  
The online privacy needs of consumers typically conflict with several common organisational goalsin particular, the 
maximisation of the personal information resource value through disclosure to third parties (often for commercial gain), and 
retaining of customer loyalty through improved personalised service. User online privacy needs also do not marry well with 
important societal needs such as freedom of information, or public health and safety (Etzioni, 1999; Warwick, 1997). Because 
of the widely differing perspectives, there has been much interest and activity over the past decade in the development of 
societal, national, organisational and technical solutions which provide a balance of online privacy that is regarded as fair, 
from individual, societal, national and organisational perspectives.  
The online privacy policy (OPP) (or ‛privacy statement) is a key organisational measure for assuring online information 
privacy for web site users (Babu, 2000; Lichtenstein, 2001; OPA, 2002). These policies articulate the manner in which a 
company collects, uses and protects data, and the choices offered to consumers for exercising their rights with respect to the 
use of their own personal information (Babu, 2000). The policies are intended to represent fair information privacy practices, 
as they were first defined by OECD (1980) and subsequently extended and modified by different countries to accommodate 
perceived e-business and globalisation needs (for example, NPP, 2000; FTC, 2000).  
There has been good reason to question the effectiveness of OPPs in providing consumer online protection. Studies which 
evaluated OPPs in Australia and the US revealed that a significant proportion of these policies did not satisfy recognized fair 
information practice principles, and overall, were ineffective (Anton and Earp, 2001; Babu, 2000; Culnan, 1999; enonymous, 
2000; EPIC, 1999; FTC, 2000; Freehill Hollingdale & Page, 2000; Harris Interactive, 2002; Richmond, 1999). OPPs, terms 
of service, conditions of use, and other online policies with information privacy ramifications, were frequently overlooked by 
users in their eagerness to gain access to online products and services (Babu, 2000). Typically, users either signalled consent 
to policy conditions without reading the policies, or declined them unread. Policies were often unclearfor example, they 
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were ambiguous, couched in legalese, misleading or deceptive  (Babu, 2000; Konrad and Borland, 2002). Finally, OPPs were 
found to be inconsistent with actual privacy practices, and were poorly linked to business strategy and operations in general 
(Anton and Earp, 2001; Babu, 2000).   
Interestingly, there are some indications that US OPPs have improved in quality in recent years (PFF, 2002), despite a lack of 
legislationand with solely a reliance upon industry self-regulation, combined with increased awareness mostly gained 
through media publicity. Similarly, an Australian study in February 2001 revealed a significant improvement in Australian 
OPP quality and quantity, well in advance of the new privacy laws compliance deadline of December, 2001 (Anderson, 
2001). However, privacy violations and incidents continue to fuel public anxiety, with significant blame frequently being 
apportioned to ineffective OPPs (CNET, 2002;  Mainelli, 2002).  
In order to promote the effectiveness of OPPs and consumer confidence in these, a range of societal and technological 
measures are available. Privacy policy enforcement via legislation (for example, Australias amended Privacy Act) or 
industry self-regulation (for example, the US situation) are alternative or complementary approaches, although the FTC 
(2000) advised that legislation was still urgently needed in the US, despite the reported improvements in policies, previously 
mentioned. Reports of a recently proposed US online privacy law indicate important industry concerns with respect to such 
laws, although some type of legislation appears inevitable  (EPIC, 2002; Hollings, 2002). Third party verification that a 
companys privacy practices match its OPP was identified in a recent poll as the single most important measure for increasing 
consumer trust in e-business (Harris Interactive, 2002). Web privacy seals such as TrustE, independent audits and privacy 
certification are examples of mechanisms for such verification, as well as representing an assessment of the level of personal 
information protection afforded by a policy (see for example, APCC, 2001). Technologies such as P3P enable users to view a 
technologically-translated version of a web sites OPP in a more usable form, provided that the web site has created its OPP 
according to P3P specifications and the user also has a P3P-enabled browser (Reagle and Cranor, 1999; W3C, 2002). 
However, critics of this approach point to the limitations of any technological translation of OPP and related matching with 
user online privacy needsand note that to date, few companies have adopted this method for specifying OPPs (Harvey and 
Sanzaro, 2002). 
In order to minimise reliance upon societal and technological support for OPPs, organisations can attempt to couch and 
present these policies in more effective ways, using guidelines designed for this purpose. Although various sets of guidelines 
already exist, there are very good reasons for developing new, improved guidelines. Existing guidelines (for example, FTP, 
2000; NPP, 2000; OPA, 2002) were not developed from empirical evidence, but rather were based on professional expertise, 
and therefore may have missed some of the issues, especially in such a dynamic, complex area. Some progress has been 
made toward developing empirically grounded, organisational guidelines. For example, Anton and Earl (2001) studied a set 
of health privacy policies using a goal search approach, and thus identified a taxonomy of OPPs, although this did not 
account for contextual issues such as organisational and societal factors, and usability. Babu (2000) reported that existing sets 
of guidelines possessed some, but not all, of the desired characteristics. Finally, recent evidence suggests that existing OPPs 
are ineffective in managing the risks (Regan, 2001; Sullivan, 2002), possibly due to deficiencies in current sets of guidelines. 
Our aim in this paper is to investigate the potential of organisational guidelines for developing effective OPPs. Following this 
brief survey of the literature and current research into online privacy protection, we overview our research methodology. 
Next, we provide a set of guidelines for effective online privacy policybased on the findings of Babu (2000), which we 
have extended via additional empirical investigations. Our guidelines are accompanied by a discussion of the issues arising 
from our study. Finally, we draw conclusions, and posit future research directions. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
This study was conducted in two stages, two years apart. In the first stage, conducted in 2000, a literature review was used to 
develop a model of guidelines for OPP (Babu, 2000). Next, with the dual aims of identifying weaknesses in current OPPs in 
order to assess their quality, and acquiring knowledge with which to improve the model,  a critical analysis of OPPs residing 
on the web sites of eight American businesses and two Australian businesses was performed (Babu, 2000). The sites in 
question were chosen because they were highly active and recognised e-business sites at the time of study, and because they 
featured substantial OPPs. The ten policies were pattern-matched for guideline compliance, as indicated by a reasonable 
implementation of the guideline within the policy. Each policy was also analysed contextually, taking into account the 
influence of HCI, organisational and human factors and other issues.  A cross-case analysis of the policies facilitated 
identification of trends, patterns and differences. In order to further explore and improve the guidelines by capturing the 
relationship between an OPP and its organisational context, Babu conducted an in-depth case study of a recognized 
Australian online retailercalled here OzESalevia semi-structured interviews, and document collection. As a result of 
these empirical investigations, Babu revised the guidelines for OPP (Babu, 2000).  
In the second stage of this projectour extension of the original investigationswe reviewed recent literature, and the 
original research data and results (including the guidelines). We also analysed the nine still existing site OPPs in their 
updated forms as at April, 2002. We identified trends, patterns and differences in order to arrive at our final research 
resultsa set of guidelines for effective OPPs, and a discussion of the issues arising from our study, both of which follow. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: GUIDELINES FOR ONLINE PRIVACY POLICY 
We provide in this section a comprehensive set of high level guidelines for online privacy policies, in the following 
categories: awareness, data quality, choice, security, information movement, user participation, assurance, children’s 
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privacy, change, user identification, sensitive information, accountability, contact and exceptions (compiled from Babu, 
2000; Anton and Earp, 2001; NPP, 2000; FTC, 2000 and our empirical studies). For presentation and comprehension 
purposes, we have grouped the guidelines into seven tables, Tables 1  7, representing the following OPP areas: awareness, 
data quality and security, information movement, user identification and accountability, user participation, change and 
special cases.  Greater detail for the guidelines is not provided, because clearly this will depend, to varying extents, upon 
national regulation (for example, legally, Australian businesses must comply with NPP, 2001). Note that not all guidelines 
included in our set are addressed by various national regulations, although our study suggests that all our guidelines are 
important, and therefore worthy of inclusion in our final set. Our set of guidelines is intended as a map for businesses, to 
ensure that all important areas are addressed in the development of OPPs. 
Overall, we found that the OPPs studied early in 2002 had improved in quality since 2000. We attribute this development 
mainly to an increased consciousness of online privacy issues within the e-business community, combined with privacy 
legislation or industry self-regulation based upon recognized fair information practice principles. Despite our finding of 
overall improvement in quality since 2000, we nevertheless found that a significant portion of the guidelines in our set were 
inadequately addressed or missing, in many of the OPPs in 2002. Following, we discuss issues arising from our study of the 
nine policies and the case study, under the headings of the OPP areas represented by the seven tables. Due to the limitations 
of paper size, we have limited the discussions to selected aspects only. 
 
Awareness Guidelines Brief Description of Guideline 
1. Awareness The company should facilitate user awareness of its privacy policies.  
1.1 Prominence/openness 
 
A clearly-labelled link to the policy should be displayed in a conspicuous manner and position
on every page. The company should provide the companys privacy policy and  relevant  
explanations to a user, on request. 
1.2 Language 
 
The policy should be written in simple English, and be clear, logically-structured, consistent  
and unambiguous. 
1.3 Notification The policy link should be made available whenever personal information is requested by the 
web sitein a prominent position, adjacent to the data collection boxes. 
1.4 Classification The policy should identify each field of personal information collected by the site. 
1.5 Collection Personal information collected should be linked to the business transaction that the user is 
engaged in at the time of providing it. 
1.6 Purpose/use Personal information collected should only be disclosed or used for purposes related to the 
original collection purpose. 
1.7 Disclosure  Sites should state third parties to whom information will be disclosed, and exactly which 
information will be disclosed to each party, with conditions of disclosure clearly stated.  
1.8 Consumer education The site should provide, or link to, consumer education about online privacy issues, rights 
 and responsibilities.   
1.9 Third party 
      involvement 
The user should be informed about company or user responsibilities with respect to online 
 privacy protection at third party sites linked to by the site, or by other third parties to  
 whom information may be disclosed.  
Table 1: Awareness guidelines for online privacy policy  
Awareness (Table 1) A company has a duty to promote user awareness of the online privacy issues resulting from a site 
visit. The minimum requirement is a conspicuous link to the OPP, located in a consistent location on each page of the site
and, indeed, we found that all sites featured such a link in both 2000 and 2002. The next level of facilitating user awareness is 
to provide a conspicuous link to the OPP whenever user privacy is being threatened in some wayfor example when 
personal information is being requested from a user. None of the sites provided this type of awareness in 2000, although a 
few did in 2002 in respect of data collection and several other privacy threats. With respect to communication qualitywhich 
is clearly required for effective user awarenessmost sites were written in moderately complex English, in both 2000 and 
2002. We found many misspellings, inconsistencies, legalese, and other confusing aspects of expression and layoutmaking 
most policies difficult to comprehend or navigate. Another aspect of awareness is the degree of classification of personal 
information being collected by the site. Most sites, in both 2000 and 2002, failed to provide this level of detail. As an 
example of the informality we encountered in this regard, one policy stated: ‛Depending on what you purchase, we may also 
need to collect other personal information, like your clothing size... In contrast, eBay featured a very informative, complete, 
personal information access chart, with each field of personal information plotted against those third parties granted the 
specified accesses, once the information was collected by the site.  
Other types of awareness are needed. An OPP should make the user aware of the purpose for which personal information is 
being collected. We found minimal linking of collected personal information to individual user transaction purpose in both 
years, although sites did provide general reasons for collecting personal information overallfor example, We use that 
information to service your account and to personalize your experience at ... , and several sites provided long lists of specific 
uses, although each of the items listed was still fairly general. Informing the user of potential future disclosure of their 
information is also an important component of awareness. We found considerable complexity about the way such disclosure 
information was presented, with little information about the conditions under which disclosures would take place. 
Confounding the user about disclosure practices was common.  In one OPP we found, We'll never share that information 
with third parties interested in e-mailing you. This, of course, did not preclude collected personal information from being 
shared with third parties with interests other than e-mailing the userfor example, placing pop-up advertisements on the 
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users computer. Consumer education for the purpose of increasing user awareness of online privacy issues, was missing 
from all policies in 2000, except for one OPP which provided links to recognised information privacy expertise sites. 
However by 2002, four of the OPPs provided such links. Despite these signs of improvement, we believe that much more 
than links of this type are needed for effective consumer education. Another responsibility of sites is to inform users about the 
level of protection afforded at third party sites linked to by the site, as well as at other third parties with whom personal 
information could be shared in the future.  In 2000, only three policies provided privacy protection information about third 
party sites linked to (although these were merely disclaimers), rising to eight in 2002 (most of which were disclaimers, 
although some were assurances of similar levels of privacy protection). In 2000, none of the OPPs provided privacy 
protection information about third parties to whom information could be disclosed by the company through private 
negotiations (ie third parties not hyperlinked to the site), rising to four OPPs in 2002. Hence, there has been some 
improvement in this area. 
 
Data Quality and Security 
 Guidelines 
Brief Description of Guideline 
2. Data quality Personal information must be kept complete, timely and correct, by the company. 
3. Security Personal information should be secured wherever possible. 
3.1 Data security The company must secure personal information against external and internal threats to its 
confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
3.2 Data transmission  The user must be informed regarding the risks of data information in transmission across the 
Internet. The user should be provided with alternate means of divulging personal information.
3.3 Cookies The user must be fully informed about any use of cookies. The company should state if it 
uses cookies, the purpose for which they are used, the information stored and used by them. 
The user should be given the option of rejecting a cookie each time one is about to be stored 
on his/her computer. 
 
Table 2: Data quality and security guidelines for online privacy policy 
Data quality and security (Table 2) Six OPPs facilitated user access for the purpose of checking and correcting collected 
personal information, increasing to nine in 2002. In many cases the user was given a contact email address, rather than a form 
to update, as the only access method. In all situations, all responsibility for data quality assurance rested with the user, with 
none being guaranteed by the company, other than security assurances, as follows. Five OPPs in 2000, increasing to all in 
2002, provided some commitment to data security, indicating use of SSL, firewalls and other technologies, with 
corresponding symbols such as padlocks on the sites. General security assurance statements were commonly found in OPPs, 
for example, ‛We employ many different security techniques to protect such data from unauthorized access by users inside 
and outside the company, while general disclaimers were popular, for example, ‛However, "perfect security" does not exist 
on the Internet and ‛does not ensure or warrant the security of any information you transmit to us or from our online 
products or services, and you do so at your own risk. However by 2002, two of the OPPs listed extensive security provisions, 
while other sites had added to theirs. For example, one OPP assured: the use of secure connections from customer browser to 
company site, encryption for sensitive personal information, logical security of databases on company systems, access 
restrictions to such databases, employee corporate data confidentiality contracts, and quality assurance procedures to ensure 
product development did not compromise existing privacy protection. We view this as a promising trend. In 2000, none of the 
policies provided information about the security of data in transmission (for example, the risk that it could be intercepted in 
transmission), however by 2002, almost all policies were providing disclaimers about information protection while in 
transmission. Statements about use of cookies were present in all policies, although cookie use was often vaguely specified or 
confusing. An interesting observation we make is that cookies are sufficiently mistrusted these days that clearly stating their 




Brief Description of Guideline 
4. Information Movement Information privacy protection should be provided in all states of information movement. 
4.1 Information monitoring Policies should specify and explain monitoring of user activity through cookies, etc. 
4.2 Information aggregation Policies should inform users about use of aggregation of personal information with data 
from other sources, and any linking of aggregated data with other data, in particular, PII.  
4.3 Information storage Policies should inform users about personal information stored in the company systems, 
 as well as the purpose and duration for which the information is stored. 
4.4 Information transfer Policies must state to whom, why and when collected personal information will be 
transferred, as well as other relevant conditions. 
4.5 Information disposal Policies should inform users of how and when they dispose of personal information. This 
should be when the purpose for which the information was collected has been completed. 
4.6 Information personalisation Policy should state how the site plans to personalise services offered to them by using  
personal information collected from the user.    
4.7 Transborder data flow Privacy assurance afforded when information crosses borders, should be addressed. 
 
Table 3: Information movement guidelines for online privacy policy 
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Information movement (Table 3) A few sites in 2000 and all in 2002 made some commitment to explaining their use of 
cookies as a form of monitoring or tracking for the purpose of better serving the user. Although the level of detail provided 
was sometimes quite high, it was still too easy to miss the import of a monitoring use when buried amongst wordy 
explanations. With respect to aggregation, we found, at times, disturbing inconsistencies. For example, one policy stated in 
one section that anonymous (ie non PII, such as IP address) information would not be linked to the users PII without their 
consent (ie there was choice), while in another section, the policy stated that it would in future be considering giving the user 
a choice as to whether the anonymous information collected could be linked to PII, as currently the information could be 
linked (ie there was no user choice). Regarding information storage, only data quality or security issues were addressed in 
policies (as discussed earlier), and the duration of storage was not made explicit in most cases, in either year. Policies made 
attempts to indicate where personal information would be transferred, and the level of protection provided at these third 
parties (refer Table 1, third party involvement). Several policies attempted to address this issue, but the resulting effect was 
often confusion or a cause for concern, eg ‛Information collected at this site may be disclosed to third parties where functions 
are being outsourced. Regarding information disposal, in 2002 four of the policies referred to the user needing to take 
responsibility for deleting their personal information via email, and/or mentioned that personal information would be deleted 
once the user had completed a related transaction (eg an email enquiry). The other five policies did not address the disposal 
of information. Information personalisation was addressed by all policies in a very general manner in 2002, with statements 
such as ‛information collected is used to provide the customer with better service.  Information protection, should collected 
personal information cross borders, was addressed by about half the policies in 2002. 
 
 
User identification and 
accountability guidelines 
Brief Description of Guideline 
5. User identification 
 
The use and disclosure of a users site identifier as either PII, anonymous, or 
 pseudonymous, should be addressed.  
5.1 User identifier The company should not adopt as the user identifier, an identifier ascribed to that  
individual by another organisation. 




If a user can employ pseudonymous identification, while still being held accountable, 
the ramifications for the user should be explained.  
5.4 Nonrepudiation The policy should indicate whether a user can be held accountable for his/her site 
 actions through an action being indisputably linked to a user identifier.  
6.  Accountability Company and user should each  be held accountable for their actions with respect to 
online privacy. 
6.1 Enforcement There should be a mechanism by which the user can enforce the policy.  
6.2 User responsibilities User responsibilities in safeguarding their online privacy should be explained.  
 
Table 4: User identification and accountability guidelines for online privacy policy 
 
User identification and accountability (Table 4) User identification issues were poorly addressed by policies in both 2000 
and 2002. A few policies made forays into these areas, but we do not believe the explanations provided would have been 
comprehensible to the average Internet user. With respect to accountability, the only mechanisms for user enforcement of 
policy provided by most OPPs in both years was an email contact address, and/or the presence of privacy seals. Five sites in 
2000 and seven in 2002 bore a privacy seal (for example, TRUSTe), while email address contacts were provided in almost all 
cases in both years. One site discouraged all contact, claiming it did not have the resources to respond to enquiries and that 
the user would be kept waiting if they enquired.  Very little information about user roles and responsibilities featured in the 
policies. Some small attempts at this have been made in the policies reviewed since two years ago, indicating that companies 
are now more aware of this important aspect of OPPs. In some policies, users were advised to safeguard their passwords, and 
to sign off and close browsers at the end of accessing the sites. Finally, we believe it would be very difficult for users to 
identify their responsibilities with respect to managing their online privacy in current policies, with responsibilities currently 
spread throughout in piecemeal fashion. 
 
User participation (Table 5) An OPP should provide opportunities for user participation in their own privacy protection. All 
sites in 2002 provided user access to their own personal information via either an online form or via email contact, in order to 
check and correct their information. Some policies addressed situations in which users were given access to other users 
personal information through the web sites facilities, for example via bulletin boards where users could post notices 
including their email addresses, names and so forth. Users can also participate through obtaining assurance about methods. In 
order to provide verification that a company is adhering to its OPP in practice, the company can seek certification (via annual 
audit) and display a corresponding sealsuch as the Australian Privacy Seal (APCC, 2001). The presence of such a seal on 
the site provides potential customers with a sense of assurance that a site's policies and business practices are legitimate and 
trustworthy (Sciortino, 2002). Five sites in 2000 and seven in 2002 bore a privacy seal such as TRUSTe. Statements of 
guarantee in the policy can also reassure the user. We found that some companies had loopholes in these. For example, 
RealNetworks in 2002 stated it would use ‛reasonable efforts to comply with this privacy policy and will take prompt 
corrective action when it learns of any failure to comply with our privacy policy but indicated that it frequently released 
early versions (alpha and beta) of its products, which being test products only, could result in unintended privacy issues. The 
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OPPs in our study did not address how the companies would incur sanctions if they failed to comply with their policies, other 
than to provide a contact point such as phone number or email address, where a user complaint could be lodged. Where a seal 
is on the sitefor example, the Australian Privacy Sealthe consumer can complain to a representative about a perceived 
policy infringement, and the seal can be revoked if the company has indeed breached policy.  
 
  User participation guidelines Brief Description of Guideline 
7. User Access Users should have opportunity to participate in their personal information 
protection as necessary. 
7.1 User access and  
correction, to own data 
Companies should allow users to have fair and suitable access to their 
own information. When necessary, the user should be allowed to modify or 
add to the data held about him/her, and if legally justified, the user should 
be allowed to erase the data. 
7.2 User access to other  usersdata Policies should state any privacy protection for user access to other users data. 
8. Assurance Policies should state ways in which companies assure users that they are following 
OPPs in practice. 
8.1 User recourse A company should provide users with mechanisms by which their complaints can 
be resolved, for example, a company Privacy Officers e-mail address. 
8.2 Verification There should be a mechanism by which the companys privacy practices can be 
 verified by the userfor example, a privacy seal. 
8.3 Consequences There should be procedures in place which deal with companies which deal with 
companies which fail to comply with their OPPs. 
9. Contact Policies should state how, and for what purpose, organisations contact users, using 
PII to make the contact. Users should have an opportunity to opt-out of contact. 
10. Choice The user should be given choices with respect to collection and use of personal data. 
10.1 Consent The web site should offer users the option to opt-out or opt-in of personal data 
 Collection, disclosure to other parties, and services provided based on personal 
 information collected. 
Table 5: User participation guidelines for online privacy policy 
 
Users are sometimes contacted by companies via contact details provided by the user. We observed that the methods 
available for users to opt out of such contacts were complex and discouraging, with little improvement between 2000 and 
2002. Users should be given plentiful choice, particularly consent opportunities, with respect to the provision or use of their 
personal information. In 2000, all nine policies provided ‛opt-out rather than ‛opt-in for collection or use of personal 
information. However by 2002, most of the policies were offering complex combinations of opt-out and opt-in within their 
OPPs, which can be confusing for users.   Furthermore, consent was sometimes offered covertly, for example, By using ... 
and providing us with your personal information, you are accepting the privacy practices described in this policy statement.  
We observed a move toward offering more choices regarding information disclosed to other parties, cookies stored, 
subscriptions to company mailing lists, and other often unwanted services enabled by collected personal information. 
 
  Change management guidelines Brief Description of Guideline 
11. Change management Companies require procedures for change management of their OPPs. 
11.1 Evolution The company should conduct regular reviews of the company privacy practices and 
privacy policies. The privacy policy should include changes that have occurred in 
regard to the handling of personal information. 
11.2 Changes to policy A company should inform its customers whose material it has collected of material  
changes in its information privacy practices.   
11.3 Change of company control A company should inform users about personal information protection in the event 
of a sale, merger, or other transfer of ownership of the company.  
Table 6: Change management guidelines for online privacy policy  
Change management (Table 6) In 2002, mention was made in several policies that there would be policy reviews and hence 
changes in policy, from time to time. Some sites announced these changes in advance, giving fair warning. In most of the 
OPPs for 2002, the user is advised to check back at the site from time to time to see if a new version of the OPP existed. It is 
unreasonable to expect a user to recall the version of the policy that was in the place during previous site accesses, especially 
as those accesses may be sporadic and/or spaced well apart in time. We suggest that companies provide users with the 
opportunity to be informed via email of announcements of new OPPs, and that the frequency of revised policies per annum is 
not too high. Alternatively or in addition, archives of previous versions of OPPs can be stored by the company and made 
available to users via links placed on the site. A user can be directed to the policy version that was in place when s/he last 
accessed the site, and/or when s/he entered personal data; that is the policy which should apply to the data provided by the 
user at that time, and the policy should inform the user accordingly. In 2000, only two of the policies advised users of the 
impact of a change of company control on user information privacy, however in 2002, five of the policies mentioned this. 
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  Special Cases Guidelines Brief Description of Guideline 
12. Children’s Privacy The policy should dictate clearly regarding the involvement of children. The policy 
should state whether minors are permitted to use the site and the parental consent 
that is required, if they are so permitted. Parental consent should be verifiable.  
13. Sensitive information Sensitive information should be treated differently to other personal information, 
for example, religious beliefs. 
14. Exceptions Exceptions to the policy should be clearly stated. 
Table 7: Special cases guidelines for online privacy policy 
Special cases (Table 7) Childrens privacy issues were only addressed in three OPPs in 2000, increasing to five in 2002. This 
is interesting because both countries studied, Australia and the US, require childrens issues to be addressed, by law. Sensitive 
information was addressed in two of the policies in 2000, increasing to six in 2002. Exceptions were nominated by all policies 
in both years. 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
We have focused in this paper on the role of effective online privacy policies in online privacy protection. We provided a set 
of high level organisational guidelines for companies to use in the development of an effective OPPas well as a descriptive 
analysis of the evolution of Australian and US OPPs over the past two years. Although our results are limited to a 
longitudinal study of nine policies over two years, and a single case studyand of course we cannot generalise from this 
small sample of dataour results are yet indicative of a significant improvement in the quality of OPPs over the period 2000-
2002, attributed to increased public awareness of the issues combined with legislation/industry self-regulation. One would 
hope to find a parallel increase in the effectiveness of OPPs and, although we have not measured this in our work, the results 
of the survey by PFF (2002) certainly suggest this is likely. Nonetheless, there is still a significant shortfall between policies, 
and the requirements for such policies as indicated by our guidelines. We believe that the use of our guidelines will improve 
OPPs still further, as well as adding to existing empirically-based theory in this area (theory of which there is little to date). 
Our guidelines are preliminary, in that they are based on the small sample of data explored, and are therefore highly unlikely 
to yield all of the issues or requirements for OPP guidelines. However, we believe we have provided a solid foundation upon 
which to build, in future research. Combining our interpretive analysis approach with the quantitative content-based approach 
of Anton and Earp (2001) may yield interesting results, as may a combination with other forms of empirical researchfor 
example, a focus group comprised of representatives from the following key stakeholder groups: consumers, business 
managers, IT security technologists, human resource experts, legal experts and privacy experts. We note that focus groups 
can be particularly useful in the multi-disciplinary domain of e-business research (Lichtenstein and Swatman, 2002). 
Our study has yielded a number of important themes. Firstly, there is a great deal of confusion for a user who is attempting to 
ascertain the relationship between the OPP and other online and offline company policies. Answers are needed for questions 
such as: ‛What is the relationship between an organisations (offline) privacy policy and its OPP? What is the relationship 
between the OPP and other online policies such as: terms of use, legal policy and security policy?  Appropriate relationships 
between the OPP and all kinds of other company policies must be established, so that policies can be effectively linked and 
integrated.  At present, consumers would likely feel confused by the loose and oft confusing linkages between these policies 
as currently suggested (or frequently, not suggested) by sites. 
Taking this theme one step further, research is required to identify and/or develop links between online policies of all types, 
and their corresponding company offline policies.  It is neither feasible nor appropriate to dump all company policies online 
merely by mirroring their existing offline forms, chunked into slightly smaller screen packets accessible via links from an 
initial list of topic headingsor worse, presented as a lengthy online document, which the user has to scroll down 
(tiresomely) to read in its entirety. Offline company policies were not designed to be human computer interfaces. Clearly, 
research into requirements for online versions of offline company policies would provide some illumination of these issues. 
We make a note here that a policy noticeably absent from all sites studied was an online Code of Ethics, which a site user 
may find useful to consult, and which could increase user trust in the company visited. Companies may well consider 
developing and featuring such a policy. 
A second message emerging from our study is that there is a clear need for more usable OPPs (Babu, 2000; Greenberg, 1999; 
Lau et al, 1999). Adding import to this issue, usability has been identified as an important factor in all types of online policies 
for the securing of consumer trust (Egger, 2001; Nielsen Norman Group, 2001). In our study, the OPPs were notoriously 
ambiguous, difficult to read, poorly structured, and generally difficult to understand. Overall, the policies were hindered by 
poorly designed HCIssome more so than othersand clearly would be improved by the use (during their design) of a good 
usability framework for OPPs. In another study, we are investigating this very issue and developing such a framework. In our 
work-in-progress, we are exploring the use of tools such as OPP site maps, FAQ, summaries, audit reports and other features 
for improving the usability of OPPs.  
A third leitmotif in this study was the lack of communication by OPPs of user roles and responsibilities with respect to 
managing of online privacy. These important advices are typically dispersed throughout an OPP, and are mostly covert or 
poorly stated. In many cases, significant user roles and responsibilities (with respect to managing their online privacy) are not 
stated in the OPP but rather are found in other online policies, such as ‛terms of use. Relevant user roles and responsibilities 
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must be stated explicitly within the OPP in an accessible (usable) way. For example, a user should be able to consult a single 
chart in the OPP, outlining all her responsibilities in managing her online personal privacy on a continuing basis. Clearly 
there is a need for researching a set of potential roles and responsibilities for the different stakeholders in managing online 
privacy, while appropriate techniques and HCI designs should be developed for presenting these duties to users in the most 
effective manner. 
A fourth concern we identified is that there is a clear need for a user to be able to consult his/her OPP history with respect to a 
particular site. We did not find one OPP which provided this facility, in our studya deficiency which is bound to engender 
user anxiety eventually, especially once related incidents are published in the popular media with greater frequency.  In a 
recent case involving Hotmail, many users were startled to discover they had unwittingly given their permissionsthrough 
earlier incarnations of Hotmails OPPfor their personal information to be disclosed to third parties (Mainelli, 2002). Yet 
some of these users were convinced they had never given such permissions. An accurate, accessible record of the user/OPP 
historywhich tracks each users actions in respect of the OPP, including disclosure consents given and not givenwould 
prove useful to document the facts, and make them accessible for user and company validation.  
A fifth observation was that all but one of the nine OPPs studied failed to articulate the threats to a users online privacy. 
eBay  provided a vulnerabilities scenario analysis which provided some information in this respect.  We suggest that threat 
analyses and vulnerability analyses are made available through the OPP, together with an outline of steps a consumer can 
take to minimise the vulnerability of her personal information to the threats stated. This will oblige a business to assess risks 
for the various online privacy threatsan exercise which would undoubtedly prove useful for the business themselves, as 
well as the users and indeed, other interested parties such as auditors. 
A sixth message emerging was the poor linkage between online privacy policy and privacy practice, as evidenced by our case 
study of OzeSale, where there was apparently very little connection between the two. Normally, company policies are 
translated into procedures which are documented and followed, thereby facilitating not only correct implementation of the 
policies, but also audits and reviews. We would like to see companies developing privacy procedures from their OPPs, and 
the documentation of these procedures, forming some recourse for consumers with grievances. 
A seventh theme was our observation of the interplay of many different types of factors in the topic area of OPP.  The focus 
has recently shifted in e-business and information systems research toward holistic approaches which integrate the human, 
social, organisational and technical issues (Baskerville et al, 2000; Lichtenstein, 2001; Lichtenstein and Swatman, 2001). 
Lichtenstein (2001) developed an holistic framework for the development, content and factors in e-business policy, and we 
believe a comprehensive framework of this type, for the development, content and factors in OPPs would be of benefit to 
companies.  
Finally, we observed through the in-depth case study some indication as to why organisations may not be following their 
online privacy policies in practice (many such policy violations have been widely reported). It appears that privacy 
infrastructures within companies are not yet powerful or developed sufficiently to enforce their privacy policies inside the 
companies themselves, although this may be changing with a recent trend toward establishing organisational Privacy Officer 
functions and privacy certification with annual audits.  As mentioned at the start of our paper, a study by Harris Interactive 
(2002) strongly suggests that third party verification that a companys privacy practices match its OPP is the single most 
important step toward increasing consumer trust in e-business. In an era where consumer demand for online privacy is high 
and the issue of trust is paramount to e-business success, it would behoove companies to pay attention not only to improving 
the quality and effectiveness of their online privacy policiesbut also to adhering to them, in practice.  
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